Conservatives and Labour both "Chicken Out" on Ulster -12-04-97

 Even after the Railway and Motorway problems British newspapers, perhaps in hindsight foolishly, were dismissive of future disruptive trends. The newspapers from the UK after Aintree will no doubt "sing a different song" and will be invoking the "Dunkirk" spirit and the "Britain (England) can take it" philosophy. Already the dangerous rhetoric of "no dialogue with Sinn Fein" is being bandied about, with each of the main parties attempting to outdo each other.

 All this is nonsense!

 When the normally authoritative military intelligence review, "Jane's", published a series of articles last August, critical of the capacity of the armed republican movement, the Celtic League issued a warning that such claims were based on propoganda more than objective military comment.

 The "Dunkirk spirit" is going to become increasingly strained as bomb alerts, actual and hoax, pervade.

 Only fully inclusive talks can resolve this situation and the sooner the parties engage the better for all the peoples of these Islands. Strains on the structure of the United Kingdom, involving calls for Independence or devolution, can be confronted politically in the other Celtic countries, so why not Ulster?

 The main log jam on political progress in N.E. Ireland is not the IRA but rather the nasty and uncompromising veto which the British government has allowed the Ulster Unionists. Their ugly and menacing belligerence was on display publicly on Friday (04-04-97) evening. For them the Aintree media attention provided a welcome diversion from the torching of the Churches of Catholic worshippers which was undoubtedly stimulated by Unionist politicians at the Friday rally.

 Last week the two main political parties in England were attempting to outdo each other parading giant chickens, however when it comes to confronting the realities of N. E. Ireland it seems they're both chicken!

 J.B. Moffatt, General Secretary 

An Intelligence report on the IRA in Janes Intelligence Review entitled "Uncovering the Irish Republican Army" sheds little light on the 'Secret Army'. The Celtic League challenge some of its comments and assumptions and conclude articles of this type do nothing but foster hopes within the British military of the 'false dawn' of defeat of the armed Republican movement -25-08-96

 A lot of the material is conjectural or is re-hashed from earlier statements and publications. The articles, however, serve a useful function in that they illustrate the deficiencies in intelligence available to the British in assessing the 'enemy' which, following the breakdown of the cease fire, they continue to face. It is interesting that a magazine conglomerate such as Janes retains the services of an outside journalist to furnish this assessment. The Defence and Intelligence publication is known for the close links its regular staff have to both British and overseas military and intelligence sources. The failure of those sources to deliver first-hand knowledge is indicative of the difficulties the British face in understanding the strengths and weaknesses of the Irish Republican Army. The article sets out both the structure of the Republican Army and a brief assessment of those intelligence units ranged against it. Some obvious deficiencies exist in respect of the latter.
 
 

INTELLIGENCE UNITS COUNTERING THE IRA

 Turning to the North, mention of the (RUC) Special branch also significantly fails to include detail of the liaison unit formed some years ago to coordinate efforts between the RUC (SB) and their 'mainland' counterparts. Ostensibly established to enhance the flow of information between Belfast and England, an additional imperative was the suspicion with which some senior London based Special Branch Officers regarded 'the natives' in the North.MI5 receives mention as the security service of the UK. 'Its personnel' we are told have been active in Northern Ireland.

 MI5 is significantly committed to the Irish problem and has been for decades; indeed it was founded as the Special Irish Branch and the major part of its "raison d'etre" is still Ireland. This commitment extends to large scale intelligence gathering involving GCHQ and other centres plus liaison to overseas intelligence services . The mention, in the article, of close liaison between MI5 and the Scotland Yard Special Operations Department should have warranted special attention in a thorough intelligence assessment. There is little doubt that the deep distrust between these two strands of British counter terrorism has contributed immeasurably to the ability of Oglaigh na h'Eireann to establish, support and contain consistent Army operations in England.

 The British Army's brief mention alludes to the role of the SAS. We are told there is 'at least' a troop (of SAS) active in N. Ireland. No mention here of the well established counter insurgency section built up by the British Army over twenty five years and specifically tasked to the North (This is well documented by former disaffected intelligence employees of the British). Indeed, the reference to the SAS being 'actively deployed' in the north is somewhat dated. Even the Celtic League's somewhat "amateurish" intelligence machine had concluded that Special Forces operations to the province were, on many occasions, mounted with air support from bases in the UK considered doubly secure both from the IRA and untrustworthy 'paddies' in the RUC (SB). The operations in S. Armagh to detain suspects for the London bombings is one such recent example.
 
 

THE IRA - ITS STRUCTURE AND DEPLOYMENT

THE IRA - ITS RESOURCES

 The section on arms procurement also rehashes an old favourite of media analysts, the IRA's preoccupation with obtaining ground to air missiles. These, we are told, are essential in order to gain superiority over the British Army's ability to sustain border garrisons in the North. The capacity of the border based ASUs of the IRA to mount a challenge to air operations is now well proven. Examination of news records will show that fire fights (successful from the IRA perspective) between units and the British Army, particularly in S. Armagh, were a regular occurrence just prior to the cease fire. The British Army, invariably supported by helicopters, does not seem to have gained any advantage.

 The articles were entitled "Uncovering the Irish Republican Army". If this is the best Janes can do, the Republican movement has nothing to fear from British "Intelligence". Sean Boyne's article is not fundamentally inaccurate. It avoids the usual rhetoric associated with such articles that usually appear in British military or defence journals. If it has any faults, these are by omission of fact (and quite frankly that factual information is not available). It rehashes some questionable 'intelligence' (Did ETA really have the resources in the early 1980s to supply arms to the IRA? Did those RPG-7s allegedly obtained in 1972 come from Europe - or further afield?), but in less dramatic style than some recent articles.

 The main deficiency in the article is that, in pandering to Janes' pretensions as a military Intelligence Review, it misses the fundamental reality. The British militarily have lost their way in Ireland. Their day is done. They are beaten. The 1994 cease fire came just in time to give them a breathing space. The morale of their troops was low (any posting but Ulster); their Intelligence Machine was a squabbling jelly of conflicting interests; will we ever know the truth of those bloody deaths on a Kintyre Hillside when, in a tragic "accident", the heart was ripped out of the Ulster intelligence manpower infrastructure?

 Politically they had stalled and, despite present attempts to rewrite history, Gerry Adams and Sinn Fein, in engaging with John Hume, were setting the political agenda. Finally, the article makes dangerous and, in our view, flawed suggestions. In the final section of Part 1 it comments on recent IRA operations; recent 'failures' are taken as indicative of current manpower deficiencies in the IRA. It speculates that this campaign is being mounted with 'comparatively inexperienced people'. What is singularly apparent to most who survey recent developments is that the IRA are demonstrating that they have the capacity to continue 'armed struggle' with all the vigour of the pre 1994 situation. This is also demonstrated in the context of a general consensus in the movement that honest, open and inclusive political dialogue is still on the Republican agenda. There have been so many false dawns for the British Army in its dealings in Ireland. They should be wary of any "dawning" of the IRA's defeat this century.

 J.B. Moffatt,
pp. Celtic League.
August 1996